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Marketing the Golden Rule: Near East Relief and Philanthropy’s Role in the Political 
Economy, 1915-1930 
 
Chairperson:  Kyle Volk 
 
  The history of the American aid agency Near East Relief (NER), particularly its Golden Rule 
Sunday campaign from 1923 to 1928, reveals an integral part played by philanthropy in the 
broader political economy in the interwar years, specifically in the American food industry. 
Millions of Americans participated in the campaign by eating a simple four-cent orphanage-
style meal and donating the cost difference from their normal Sunday dinners to support 
starving children orphaned by the Armenian genocide. By the mid-twenties NER’s Golden Rule 
Sunday became a nation-wide cultural phenomenon.  
  The relief group was founded in 1915 as a temporary effort to send relief funds. But after 
World War I, the magnitude of the humanitarian catastrophe propelled it to establish facilities 
across the former Ottoman Empire which supported tens of thousands of Armenian and other 
orphans until 1930. To care for its charges, NER initially bought or solicited farmers to donate 
corn and wheat surplus and asked Americans to buy and donate processed foods such as corn 
syrup, macaroni, cocoa, flour, and sweetened condensed milk. Then, to meet dire demands and 
spur giving, the 1923 Golden Rule Sunday campaign fully co-marketed with processed foods 
industries. NER worked particularly closely with the Corn Products Refining Company (CRPC), 
which paid for NER Golden Rule advertising and in turn received NER endorsements that its 
Karo corn syrup was as healthful for American children as it had been in nourishing Armenian 
children. Meanwhile, the CPRC battled the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) over the 
labeling and healthfulness of corn syrup even as it was supported by the Department of 
Commerce to develop more commercially viable crystal corn sugars to add to other processed 
foods. Into this federal food fight and battles for consumer acceptance waded Near East Relief 
with its record of humanitarianism and reputation for child health expertise.  
 
 
 1 
Marketing the Golden Rule: 
Near East Relief and Philanthropy’s Role in the Political Economy, 1915-1930 
 
 
Figure 1. President Coolidge at the Willard Hotel, Oct. 25, 1923.1 
 
 New York society turned out one evening in September 1924 to dine in the Grand 
Ballroom of New York’s newest luxury hotel, the Hotel Roosevelt, with fifteen hundred of 
the city’s most prominent citizens. In finery and furs they sat down to a menu of macaroni 
and cheese, apricots with corn syrup, and bread served on tin plates. They toasted with tin-
can cups filled with cocoa and sweetened condensed milk. A month later, President 
Coolidge hosted the same dinner menu at the swanky Willard Hotel for a thousand 
 
1 Picture of President Coolidge from the “Preliminary Report of International Golden 
Rule Sunday, 1924,” folder 1, box 18, series 2, Talcott Williams Papers (Burke Library, 
Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University) 
 2 
prominent Washingtonians decked out in black or white tie. John D. Rockefeller, Jr. sat 
down to a similar meal, as did King George of Greece, George Clemenceau of France, and 
Prince Carl of Sweden in their European capitals. And the less glamorous also partook. In 
1925, in Tacoma five hundred people—Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, and Native 
Americans—sat down together. In the town of Mexico, Missouri, members of local churches 
enjoyed their meal on tables provided by the Knights of Columbus and chairs loaned by the 
Ku Klux Klan. In 1924 alone an estimated one million Americans enjoyed this frugal 
supper.2 
 These diverse peoples were observing International Golden Rule Sunday, a 
fundraising campaign organized by the American aid agency Near East Relief (NER). From 
1923 to 1928, millions of Americans observed the event, held between Thanksgiving and 
Christmas each year, by eating a simple four-cent orphanage-style meal. NER asked 
Americans to donate the cost difference from their normal Sunday dinners, calculated as 
three dollars for the average family, to support starving children orphaned by the 
Armenian genocide. By the mid-twenties, NER’s Golden Rule Sunday became a nation-wide 
cultural phenomenon. The relief group was founded as the American Committee for 
Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR) in 1915 by wealthy businessmen and missionary 
educators as a temporary effort to send relief funds. But after World War I, the magnitude 
 
2 See picture at the Hotel Roosevelt in the “Preliminary Report of International 
Golden Rule Sunday, 1924,” p. 8, folder 1, box 18, series 2, and “International Golden Rule 
Observance: Golden Rule Campaign, Tacoma, Washington,” p. 16, folder 10, box 7, series 2, 
Talcott Williams Papers (Burke Library); “1,500 Eat 4-Cent Meal” New York Times, Sep. 26, 
1924, p. 21; “Dinner at New Hotel,” ibid., Sep. 22, 1924, p. 9; “Aid, Not Alms, U.S. Offer to 
Europe, President Asserts,” Washington Post, Oct. 25, 1924, p. 1; “Million Americans Aid 
Near East Poor,” New York Times, Dec. 3, 1923, p. 15; Charles Vickrey, International Golden 
Rule Sunday: A Handbook (New York, 1926), 90. 
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of the humanitarian catastrophe propelled it to establish facilities scattered across the 
former Ottoman Empire which supported tens of thousands of Armenian and other 
orphans until 1930.3  
To care for its charges, NER initially followed the example of Herbert Hoover’s 
private and public food aid work during and after the war in buying or soliciting farmers to 
donate corn and wheat surplus with the inducement of creating new markets in the Near 
East. NER also began asking Americans to buy and donate processed foods such as corn 
syrup, macaroni, cocoa, flour, and sweetened condensed milk. But to meet dire demands 
and spur giving, the Golden Rule Sunday campaign fully co-marketed with processed foods 
industries to encourage donations of these foods deemed healthful for malnourished 
children. NER worked particularly closely with the Corn Products Refining Company 
(CRPC). The CPRC paid for NER Golden Rule advertising that featured NER endorsements 
that its Karo corn syrup was as healthful for American children as it had been in saving 
Armenian children.  
This marketing relationship blossomed as the CPRC battled the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) over the labeling of corn syrup in a decades-long crusade to convince 
American consumers that corn syrup was healthy.  The USDA constrained the corn 
products industry’s labeling practices at the very same time the Department of Commerce 
supported the industry’s development of more commercially-viable crystal corn sugars to 
 
3 For the recommendations on the cost of an orphan’s meal, see “Golden Rule 
Sunday,” New York Times, Nov. 30, 1923, p. 14. The organization was founded as the 
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR) in 1915, then renamed itself 
the American Committee for Relief in the Near East (ACRNE) in 1918. It became Near East 
Relief (NER) upon congressional charter in 1919. After 1930, NER incorporated a new state 
charter as the Near East Foundation (NEF) with an emphasis on development aid. 
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add to processed foods. Into this federal food fight and battles for consumer acceptance 
waded Near East Relief with its record of humanitarianism and reputation for child health 
expertise. Although it is difficult to gauge how much CPRC’s partnership with NER 
contributed to consumer acceptance of corn sugars, the long battle ended with the 
government’s 1930 decision to liberalize corn sugar labeling policies. As the Golden Rule 
Sunday campaign developed, it also partnered with retail grocers and wholesalers to 
encourage consumers to buy food products for donation and for their own consumption all 
year long, thereby making humanitarianism work for entire food supply chains within the 
marketplace.4  
This essay illuminates how NER, particularly through its Golden Rule Sunday 
campaign from 1923 to 1928, forged an integral role for philanthropy in the broader 
political economy in the interwar years, specifically in the American food industry. To meet 
its dire needs, NER worked within the market to commodify generous giving as a consumer 
activity. Farmers and expanding processed food industries supported NER’s noble 
humanitarian efforts to feed starving children—while also creating new markets for its 
goods, earning government support and consumer acceptance, and reaping economic 
benefits. The corn sugars industry specifically leveraged NER’s proven record of 
humanitarianism and child health expertise in the Near East to market its products to 
American consumers as beneficial for growing children.  
Depressed grain prices due to surpluses posed a serious economic issue after the 
First World War. At the same time, other agricultural dynamics were developing and 
 
4 For an excellent discussion of the Corn Products Refining Company’s labeling 
fights, see Kelly J. Sisson Lessens, Master of Millions: King Corn in American Culture (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Michigan, 2011), 307-356. 
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converging: the American farm lobby achieved greater national power, the associative state 
bolstered agribusiness, and the growing corn sugars industry pushed against the 1906 
Pure Food and Drug Act for greater consumer acceptance in the burgeoning processed 
foods market. NER’s work meshed with each of these significant interwar developments in 
the political economy. Furthermore, with the era’s series of revenue acts that enshrined 
individual charitable deductions and continued corporate business deductions, support for 
NER meant tax-subsidized power to shape consumer food trends.5 
One historian recently argued that the twentieth-century political economy 
developed through a “fiscal triangle—the state, a largely corporate economy, and a largely 
corporate ‘nonprofit sector’.” NER’s history illuminates the third leg of this fiscal triangle as 
it operated in the political economy during a period of rising consumerism and marketing. 
NER inherited what historian David Kennedy calls the “mobilization of emotion” during 
World War I and used it to entice American giving as a consumer activity. Its relief efforts 
worked with Hoover’s food programs, the congressional farm bloc, expanding farm lobbies, 
and food industry groups to feed foreign populations while supporting American farmers 
and food processors. Meanwhile, the interwar growth of associative governance led to 
sharp disagreements about bureaucratic organization, agribusiness policies, and pure food 
laws between the Agriculture and the Commerce Departments, with lobbyists and 
 
5 The Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 and 1909 Revenue Act exempted charitable 
corporations from taxes. The Revenue Act of 1913 established the national income tax and 
the Revenue Act of 1917 authorized private charitable deductions. Paul Arnsberger, 
Melissa Ludlum, Margaret Riley, and Mark Stanton, “A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An 
SOI Perspective,” Statistics of Income Bulletin (Winter 2008), 106-107. On corporate 
deductions of advertising expenses, see Standard Income Tax Manual, 1920 (New York, 
1920), 116. 
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businesses ranged on both sides. The history of NER’s marketing campaigns illuminates 
how an American nonprofit organization was integral to these developments.6 
Historians of American philanthropy lament that the field has been either neglected 
or questionably segmented from broader trends in social and political economic history. 
NER’s innovative work places “philanthrocapitalism” and “causumerism,” or “shopping for 
a better world,” in historical context a century before recent observers coined the terms to 
describe modern marriages of philanthropy, capitalism, and consumerism. It also reveals 
the understudied role of nonprofit corporations in the history of the politics and culture of 
food, with its significant implications for nutrition, health, and ecology today. Additionally,  
 
6 Jonathan Levy, “Altruism and the Origins of Nonprofit Philanthropy,” in 
Philanthropy in Democratic Societies, ed. Rob Reich, Chiara Cordella, and Lucy Bernholz 
(Chicago, 2016), 42; see also Jonathan Levy, “Appreciating Assets: New Directions in the 
History of Political Economy” American Historical Review, 122 (Dec. 2017), 1494; David M. 
Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society (1980; New York, 2004), 
119. On the interwar organizational turn and associative state see Ellis W. Hawley, 
“Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an "Associative State” 1921-
1928,” Journal of American History, 61 (June 1974), 116-140; Ellis Hawley, The Great War 
and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 
1917-1933 (New York, 1979); Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American 
Government from the Founding to the Present (Princeton, 2015); Brian Balogh, The 
Associational State: American Governance in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia, 2015). 
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it adds a crucial domestic component to the historiography of American humanitarianism 
abroad, its efforts in the Near East, and its associational role in spreading U.S. influence.7  
 
 
 
 
7 On the history of philanthropy, see Oliver Zunz, “Why is the History of 
Philanthropy Not a Part of American History?” in Philanthropy in Democratic Societies, 45–
58; Oliver Zunz, Philanthropy in America: A History (Princeton, 2012); Merle Curti, “The 
History of American Philanthropy as a Field of Research,” American Historical Review, 62 
(Jan. 1957), 352–63; Robert Bremner, American Philanthropy (Chicago, 1960). On modern 
philanthropy and capitalism, see “Survey: The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism” Economist, 
Feb. 25, 2006, p. 9; Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich 
Can Save the World (New York, 2010); Lisa Ann Richey and Stefano Ponte, Brand Aid: 
Shopping Well to Save the World (Minneapolis, 2011). On consumerism and philanthropic 
fundraising, see Scott Cutlip’s Fund Raising in the United States: Its Role in America’s 
Philanthropy (New Brunswick, 1965); Kevin Rozario, Culture of Calamity: Disaster and 
Making of Modern America (Chicago, 2007). On the history of food industries, see Bartow J. 
Elmore, Citizen Coke: The Making of Coca–Cola Capitalism (New York, 2014); Helen Zoe Veit, 
Modern Food, Moral Food: Self–Control, Science, and the Rise of Modern American Eating in 
the Early Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, 2015). On American relief for the Armenian 
genocide, see Robert L. Daniel, American Philanthropy in the Near East, 1820-1960 (Athens, 
OH, 1970); Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence 
on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis, 1971); Suzanne E. Moranian, “The Armenian 
Genocide and American Missionary Efforts,” in America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915, 
ed. Jay Winter (New York, 2003), 185-213; Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The 
Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York, 2003); Merrill D. Peterson, Starving 
Armenians: America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930 and After (Charlottesville, 
2004); Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread From Stones: The Middle East and the Making of 
Modern Humanitarianism (Oakland, 2015). I’m indebted to two pieces of scholarship that 
discuss NER’s partnerships with American mass marketing, see Jaffa L. Panken, "Lest They 
Perish": The Armenian Genocide and the Making of Modern Humanitarian Media in the U.S., 
1915-1925” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2014) and Sarah Miglio, “‘Civilizing the 
World’: Progressive Religion and Politics from Chicago to the Middle East, 1890-1925” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 2012). For broader treatments of American 
humanitarianism, see Ian Tyrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America's Moral 
Empire (Princeton, 2010), Bruno Cabanes. The Great War and the Origins of 
Humanitarianism, 1918-1924 (Cambridge, 2014); Stephen Porter, Benevolent Empire: U.S. 
Power, Humanitarianism, and the World’s Dispossessed (Philadelphia, 2017); and, for an 
earlier ground-breaking treatment, Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American Dream: 
American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York, 1982).  
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Plight of the Armenians 
Herbert Hoover wrote that “Probably Armenia was known to the American school 
child in 1919 only a little less than England.” The plight of Armenian and other Near East 
Christians had risen in American consciousness since NER’s founding in 1915 as the 
American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR).  In the spring of 1915, the 
American Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau, Sr. was inundated with 
reports of Turks forcing ethnic Armenians and other minorities out of their businesses and 
homes and being shot, burned, or deported from their villages in long genocidal marches. 
American, Canadian, and even German missionaries told Morgenthau about the latest 
horrors in a long history of periodic Ottoman purges of the Christian minority.  Through the 
summer of 1915, Morgenthau tried to intervene with Minister of the Interior Talaat Pasha 
and urged the intercession of the Wilson administration.8  
Talaat Pasha proved impervious to American pressure. On September 3, 1915 
Morgenthau telegrammed the Secretary of State Robert Lansing, “Destruction of Armenian 
race in Turkey is progressing rapidly. . . . Will you suggest to Cleveland H. Dodge, Charles 
Crane, John R. Mott, and Stephen Wise and others to form committee to raise funds and 
provide means to save some of the Armenians.” The State Department sent the message to 
Dodge and to James Levi Barton, the Foreign Secretary for the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). Dodge was vice-president of the Phelps 
Dodge Corporation, a friend of President Wilson, and a longstanding supporter of 
protestant colleges in Constantinople and Beirut. He convened a meeting at his office in 
 
8 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: Years of Adventure, 1874-1920 
(New York, 1951), 385; Henry Morgenthau, Sr., Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story (Garden 
City, 1918), 328. 
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New York on September 16, 1915. In attendance were Barton and a number of other men 
representing the boards of missionary organizations and American educational institutions 
in the Near East. The group set an initial goal of $100,000 and raised half that sum among 
those present before the end of the meeting.9 
The group dispatched Barton and Charles Crane, a wealthy businessman and 
supporter of President Wilson, to confer with State Department officials in Washington. 
“The entire files of the Department were placed at their disposal,” according to Barton. 
From these files and other sources Barton amassed a report of atrocities which convinced 
the group that their mission would not be temporary. These men joined with three smaller 
relief organizations in November 1915 to form the American Committee for Armenian and 
Syrian Relief (ACASR), the original name for NER. From these groups ACASR received lists 
of thousands of wealthy donors known to contribute to such relief. It also began feeding 
reports and editorial material to the media in order to solicit general donations from across 
the country. Barton acknowledged the early support of the Rockefellers. The Rockefeller 
Foundation donated some $610,000 by the end of 1917. NER also received another $10 
million dollars through the American Red Cross War Relief fund by 1920—much of which 
came from the Rockefeller Foundation, $175,000 donated by the Laura Spelman 
Rockefeller Memorial fund in 1925, and other donations directly from Rockefeller family 
members.10 
 
9 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, Supplement (Washington, 1928), 988; 
James L. Barton, Story of Near East Relief, 1915-1930: An Interpretation (New York, 1930), 
4-9.  
10 Barton, Story of Near East Relief, 9-15, esp. 10; “Tell of Horrors Done in Armenia,” 
New York Times, Oct. 4, 1915, p. 1; “Consolidation of Near-East Committees” and Jerome 
Greene, “Armenian and Syrian Relief,” Oct. 18, 1916, folder 718, box 76, subseries 100N, 
series 100, RG 1, FA386a, Rockefeller Foundation records, “Armenian and Syrian Relief,” 
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The New York-based ACASR rapidly organized local committees throughout the U.S. 
and, within nine months, had 38 committees in sixteen states. It was quickly overwhelmed 
by the scope of its task. In April 1916, ACASR asked the Laymen’s Missionary Movement 
(LMM) for the use of its office spaces and staff at 1 Madison Avenue for three months. The 
LMM’s Charles V. Vickrey took charge of promotional programs for ACASR. Vickrey and the 
professional focus of the LMM propelled the ad hoc missionary-focused ACASR down the 
road towards professional humanitarianism. Copying fundraising techniques pioneered by 
the YMCA, the LMM systematically canvassed businesses outside traditional church giving. 
Most useful for ACASR was LMM’s network of “state and city Co-operating 
Interdenominational Committees.” Vickrey used this national network to build more local 
ACASR committees. He copied the LMM handbook on soliciting techniques from wealthy 
donors and publicized gut-wrenching accounts of Armenian suffering to the general public. 
Despite its outreach beyond church giving, Vickrey’s early publicity still relied heavily on 
faith-based messages for the rescue of Armenians as the oldest Christian nation in the Bible 
Lands.11  
From its inception, ACASR developed close ties with  American government entities. 
Members of Congress endorsed ACASR’s work, and in June 1916 Congress passed a joint 
resolution asking President Wilson to declare a day of giving for Armenian relief.  Wilson 
 
Charles Vickrey to Hamilton Holt, March 18, 1920, and Livingston Farrand to Hamilton 
Holt, March 20, 1920, folder 356, box 41, RG 32Q, FA326, Office of Messieurs Rockefeller 
(Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, New York); Charles V. Vickrey to Albert Shaw, 
Jan. 30, 1925, folder 142, Albert Shaw Papers (New York Public Library, New York City). 
11 “Sends $100,000 to Aid Armenian Refugees,” New York Times, Oct. 9, 1915, p. 6. 
Barton, Story of Near East Relief, 16, 373-375; William T. Ellis, Men and Missions: With a 
Foreword by John B. Sleman, Jr. Founder of the Laymen’s Missionary Movement (Philadelphia, 
1909), 74; A National Test of Brotherhood: America's Opportunity to Relieve Suffering in 
Armenia, Syria, Persia, and Palestine (New York, 1916).  
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declared October 21 and 22, 1916 as “joint days upon which the people of the United States 
may make such contribution as they feel disposed” for Armenian relief. To distribute funds, 
American diplomatic posts in the region used a network of committees and individuals 
made up of missionaries, U.S. government consuls, educators, doctors, journalists, and 
businessmen scattered through the Near East. After the U.S. entered World War I in April 
1917, ACASR’s funds were funneled through the Swedish Embassy in Constantinople, 
although nearby U.S. consuls continued to help distribute funds. During World War I and 
after, the U.S. government donated over $25 million in supplies, equipment, and funds to 
the NER, often through the U.S. Food Administration, American Relief Administration, or 
American Red Cross. Throughout its fifteen-year history, national figures such as William 
Howard Taft, Franklin Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Charles W. Eliot, Charles Evans Hughes, 
Leonard Wood, and Allen Dulles served as trustees.12   
In June 1918, the organization renamed itself the American Committee for Relief in 
the Near East (ACRNE) due to the expanded geographical scope of its work into the 
Caucasus, Persia, and the Levant. Then, with the end of the war, ACRNE decided to deploy 
its own relief workers to establish operations on the ground in the Near East. Starvation 
loomed for at least half a million Armenians and others, particularly for tens of thousands 
of orphaned or abandoned children. President Wilson issued a proclamation in support of 
ACRNE’s 1919 campaign to raise $30 million dollars in order to fund its expanded mission. 
The initial expedition with nearly 500 workers and leaders from ACRNE departed on the 
Mauretania in January 1919. The Wilson administration provided three navy ships and 
 
12 U.S. Congress, House, Relief of Armenians, 64 Cong., 1 sess., June 21, 1916, H. Rpt 
837, Serial 6910; Barton, Story of Near East Relief, 381. 
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army transports to move personnel, supplies, and equipment. Government war surplus 
transported for NER included 100 trucks, 36 motor cars, 20 motorcycles, 15 ambulances, 
and fifteen 100-bed hospital units.13  
To garner greater governmental and public support, in late 1918 ACRNE petitioned 
for incorporation by a special act of Congress. After contentious debate, the bill finally 
passed in the next session, and President Wilson signed it on August 6, 1919. Incorporated 
as Near East Relief, it was only the second humanitarian organization after the American 
Red Cross to receive a congressional charter. Although Rockefeller’s General Education 
Board had received a congressional charter in 1903, by the 1910s Congress was much 
more leery about  big-money philanthropy and denied federal charters to both the 
Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations.14 
The July 1919 House debates over the NER’s incorporation illuminate political 
leaders’ concern at the time with how federal endorsements for nonprofit corporations 
might impact American and international political economies. Congressman George 
Graham, Republican of Pennsylvania, argued that NER’s incorporation would help America 
answer the “most pathetic and distressing” cries of the persecuted Armenians and would 
imbue the relief agency with the U.S. government’s “dignity of approval” so that it could 
negotiate with entities in the Near East. In contrast, Congressman Louis Cramton, 
Republican of Michigan, argued that “we should be interested in determining whether 
 
13  Woodrow Wilson, “A Proclamation,” Nov. 29, 1918, p. 48b, American Committee 
for Armenian and Syrian Relief: Minutes, 1915-1919, RG 2, FA1305, Near East Foundation 
Records (Rockefeller Archive Center); “Advance Guard Sets Sail for Turkey,” and “First 
Contingent of Relief Expedition Underway,” News Bulletin, 3 (Jan. 1919), 1-2, 10-11, 
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/101790506. 
14 U.S. Congress, An Act to Incorporate Near East Relief, Public Law 66-25/Chapter 32, 
66 Cong, 1 Sess., Aug. 1919, 273-274; 
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some gentlemen are securing here a charter that even if they execute it properly in years to 
come may grow to be a gigantic corporation, with millions of wealth in its hands, which 
might be used for sinister purposes in this country. . . . I appeal to this House not to be 
carried away by their natural sympathy for charity . . . but instead they should look at this 
as a hard business proposition.”15   
Whatever the reservations of some congressmen, with its new congressional 
endorsement NER’s fundraising campaigns increasingly joined the broader trends in 
American mass marketing and consumer culture that exploded during and after the war. In 
late 1918, NER hired the Division of Pictorial Publicity (DPP), the poster-making arm of 
George Creel’s Committee for Public Information (CPI), to create fundraising posters for its 
huge 1919 fundraising campaign. Public relations personnel from the CPI and the artists 
from the DPP had honed their techniques during the war, and many would go on to help 
accelerate American mass consumer advertising in the 1920s. Seeking to professionalize 
and mass-market NER’s humanitarianism, NER’s General Secretary Vickrey approached 
donors as the potential consumers of humanitarian and Christian idealism in order to 
convince them to spend their money to save vulnerable children. In December 1919 alone, 
NER appeals appeared in full-page ads in 3,034 newspapers, 1,500 trade and class 
publications, a special pictorial supplement in the widely-circulated New York World, ads in 
every other New York daily, and 3,000 pages of free ads in hundreds of other publications. 
NER sold all the good reasons—charity, humanity, global brotherhood, Christian 
responsibility, character building, and sacrifice—to buy critically-needed help for 
 
15 Congressional Record, 66 Cong., 1 Sess., July 1919, pp. 2545-2548, 3007-3015, 
3151-3154; Corporations Chartered by Special Act of Congress (Washington, 1948). 
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desperate orphans. American consumers also bought in because of NER’s perceived moral 
authority and competence in saving children—all endorsed by the U.S. government. 
Humanitarian impulses were thus commodified; charitable giving became a consumer 
activity.16  
 
Figure 2. A fundraising poster for ACRNE created by the Division of Pictorial Publicity. 
“They Shall Not Perish,” Douglas Volk (1918).17 
 
Edward Bernays, a nephew of Sigmund Freud, was an early pioneer in public 
relations and served in the CPI during the war. In the 1920s he pioneered the link between 
corporate sales campaigns and social causes when, while working for a tobacco company, 
 
16 Referring to NER here simplifies the confusing name changes from ACASR to 
ACRNE to NER all between 1918 and the end of 1919. For an excellent analysis of NER’s 
marketing efforts see Panken, “Lest They Perish,” 108-124; Eric Van Shaak, “The Division of 
Pictorial Publicity in World War I,” Design Issues, 22 (Winter 2006), 32-45; Barton, Story of 
Near East Relief, 389-391; E. D. Owen to Charles Vickrey, Dec. 15, 1919, and Charles Vickrey 
to Albert Shaw, Dec. 18, 1919, box 138, Albert Shaw Papers (New York Public Library). 
17 Douglas Volk, “They Shall Not Perish: American Committee for Relief in the Near 
East” (New York, 1918), Library of Congress Prints and Photograph Division, 
https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/94513740/. 
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he convinced women’s rights activists marching in New York City to hold up Lucky Strike 
cigarettes as “torches of freedom.” Tracing the history of social causes and the “public 
relations counsel,” he said that colleges and social-service projects, citing NER by name, 
were among the first to use “appeals and a technique comparable to the war propaganda.” 
He went on to write that “charity as well as business . . . have to adopt propaganda, for the 
public must be regimented into giving money. . . . The Near East Relief . . . and all the rest, 
have to work on public opinion just as they had tubes of tooth paste to sell.” Lilian Brand, 
an economist with the Charity Organizational Society at Columbia University, was also 
among the first to analyze why people donated to philanthropic causes. She wrote in 1921 
about the donor as a “psychological problem” to whom the right appeals must be applied 
because “the emotions become fatigued.” Challenging religious teachings, she insisted that 
philanthropy was "not so much a matter of reason or of conscience as of habit, tradition, 
imitation, social pressure, and sentiment.” The YMCA was among the first charities to use 
modern fundraising techniques such as “Y” campaigns and door-to-door solicitations in the 
first decade of the century. Great Britain’s Save the Children and Society of Friends Relief 
Mission successfully used donor canvassing, clothing bundles, and child sponsorship in 
post-World War I Europe. And the American Red Cross advertised their sponsor’s 
products—Wrigley’s chewing gum, Jell-O, Lucky Strike cigarettes, and beauty products—in 
the Red Cross Magazine. NER followed their lead, but its relationships with American food 
producers, and particularly its Golden Rule Sunday campaign, far surpassed these 
organizations in its mass marketing reach and commodified moral branding.18 
 
18 “Easter Sun Finds the Past in Shadow at Modern Parade,” New York Times, April 1, 
1929, p. 1; Edward L. Bernays, “This Business of Propaganda,” Independent, Sep. 1928, p. 
198; Edward Bernays, Propaganda (New York, 1928), 26; see also Edward Bernays, 
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Farmers and Food Industries 
To meet the demands of feeding tens of thousands of children after the war, NER 
began soliciting direct donations of surplus grains. During the war, Herbert Hoover’s U.S. 
Food Administration had convinced desperate allied purchasing commissions to pay 
enticingly high prices for American grains. Corn production jumped by 5 million bushels in 
1917 and gained over $1.2 billion in value by 1918. Farmers bought more land, and farm 
mortgage debt rose 163 percent from 1910 to 1920. The war’s end sent agricultural prices 
plummeting 85 percent from 1919 to 1921, and the corn glut caused prices to drop 66 
percent. Farmers began to lose their land. The crisis spurred a more muscular farm lobby, 
built around the growing county agent system, to create the powerful American Farm 
Bureau Federation (AFBF) which by 1921 had close to a million members.19  
Senator Arthur Capper of Kansas, a leader of the congressional farm bloc and owner 
of a number of farm publications, volunteered to chair an agricultural committee within 
NER to urge farmers to donate surplus corn and other grains. NER’s Agricultural Advisory 
Committee counted among its members former farm-state governors, farm lobby heads, 
 
Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York, 1923). Lilian Brandt, How Much Shall I Give? (New 
York, 1921), 25-27, 104-106, esp. 106, Bremner American Philanthropy, 124-125. Brad 
Watson, “The Origins of International Child Sponsorship,” Development in Practice, 25 (Aug. 
12, 2015), 867-879. Rozario, Culture of Calamity, 437. 
19 Alonzo E. Taylor, Corn and Hog Surplus of the Corn Belt (Palo Alto, 1932), 7–10; 
Lawrence A. Jones and David Durand, The Mortgage Lending Experience in Agriculture 
(Princeton, 1954), 80–81; “Price of Farm Products,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, 10 (Oct. 
1924), 790; USDA, Yearbook of the USDA, 1919 (Washington, 1920), 509, 511; “Huge League 
of Farm Bureaus Launched Here,” Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1920, p. 22; Tore Olsson, 
Agrarian Crossings: Reformers and the Remaking of the U.S. and Mexican Countryside 
(Princeton, 2017), 109–10; Kennedy, Over Here, 117–123; Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion, 
194–98. 
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and luminaries from government, business, and academia. Supported by the American 
Farm Economic Association and the International Farm Congress, Capper asked farmers to 
save starving orphans while creating a taste for corn and “a possible new market for the 
great American staple.” The Indianapolis NER office told farmers that it “was the first 
introduction of corn products into the Caucasus and already several inquiries have been 
received from local governments as to the possibility of arranging for direct purchases in 
the United States of large quantities of corn meal and flour.” More than a million members 
of the National Farmer Cooperative and Educational Union from thirty states endorsed 
NER’s work. Working with the National Corn Miller’s Association, the agricultural 
committee delivered 500 train cars of corn after the 1921 harvest; in 1922 it delivered 765 
cars of primarily corn and grits, but also wheat, barley, rye, and beans—with freight 
donated by the railroads. One “small town in South Dakota furnished 100 teams, 100 
farmers, 100 wagon loads of corn.” In 1921, the Indiana Farmer’s Guide declared a “grain 
week” for Hoosier farmers to donate corn and wheat to NER. County agents helped with 
donations and grain operators offered their work for free. The Guide reminded farmers that 
by donating they were “paving the way for new markets in future years.”20 
 
20 “Appeal to Farmers to Assist Starving,” Putnam County Indiana Herald-Democrat, 
Dec. 16, 1921, p. 4. For a list of members in the NER Agricultural Committee, see a letter to 
10,000 “Gentlemen Farmers” from Arthur Capper, folder 5, box 14, series 2, and “Grain 
Campaign,” folder 3, box 8, series 2, Near East Relief 1921, Talcott Williams Papers (Burke 
Library); Alonzo E. Wilson to Barclay Acheson, telegram, Sep. 28, 1921, box 142, Albert 
Shaw Papers (New York Public Library); “Grain for the Near East Sufferers,” Indiana 
Farmer’s Guide, 33, (Nov. 5, 1921), 6; Agricultural Review, 13 (Nov. 1921), 4; “Near East 
Relief Work,” Indiana Farmer’s Guide, 34 (May 13, 1922), 502. On the congressional farm 
bloc, see Patrick G. O'Brien, “A Reexamination of the Senate Farm Bloc 1921-
1933," Agricultural History, 47 (July 1973), 248-63.   
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NER also began to buy or solicit food donations from food manufacturers, wholesale 
and retail grocers, and consumers. In 1920 Hershey Chocolate donated 25,000 pounds of 
cocoa. One 1921 NER relief ship held 5,500 tons of grains from midwest farmers, 330 tons 
of canned goods donated by Pennsylvania school children, and 5,000 cases of Karo corn 
syrup bought by NER. The National Canners Association endorsed its members to donate 
any canned goods. NER’s “Say it With Flour” campaign enlisted retail grocers to set up “coin 
posters” for consumers to buy portions of flour to send to orphans. In 1922, two Chicago 
manufacturers donated 30,000 pounds of macaroni after NER’s medical officer Doctor John 
C. Curran told the annual convention of the National Macaroni Manufacturers, “We 
physicians…have observed the wonderful recuperative value of macaroni to these starving 
little bodies. We would rather have macaroni than any other food for those hungry 
children.” Brooklyn school children sent 40,000 cans of condensed milk to NER. Even 
before the Golden Rule Sunday campaign, NER was becoming proficient in encouraging 
American food industries and consumers to buy and donate certain processed food 
products.21  
 
21 “A Christmas Gift to Orphaned Children,” folder 2, Box 7, series 2, Talcott Williams 
Papers (Burke Library); “Near East Relief Grain Campaign,” Ellis County Kansas Hays Free 
Press, Dec. 29, 1921, p. 1; “Canned Goods Offered Hoover,” Retail Grocer’s Advocate, 26 (Feb. 
25, 1921), 15; “Say it With Flour,” ibid., 26 (May 18, 1921), 8-9, 13; “Macaroni Gift Made to 
Near East Relief by Manufacturers,” American Food Journal, 17 (Aug. 1922), 40; “Two Miles 
of Milk,” New Near East, 7 (March 1922), 4; “Car Load of Milk in Relief is Reached,” 
Indianapolis Star, June 17, 1923, p. 7. 
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Figure 3. Near East Relief map of operations in 1921.22 
 
Golden Rule Sunday 
By 1923, NER needed ever more food and funds to meet the staggering 
humanitarian demands caused by continued post-war Turkish attacks on its minorities. 
Vickrey’s new idea forged an unprecedented marriage of philanthropy and consumerism 
fully enmeshed within the American food industry and supported by the state. In the fall of 
1923, as donor fatigue appeared to affect giving, NER announced its inaugural International 
Golden Rule Sunday campaign to be observed on December 2, 1923. The previous year 
President Harding had issued a special proclamation to state governors declaring 
December 3, 1922 as Near East Emergency Sunday, a day on which state and local officials, 
 
22 “Near East Relief,” map, Near East Museum, 
https://neareastmuseum.com/archives/near-east-relief-map-1921-2/. 
 20 
businesses, and civic organizations should encourage giving to NER and the American Red 
Cross.23 
Vickrey expanded on this idea to energize these same state and local entities and to 
merge the entire enterprise of giving into the complex fabric of the American food industry, 
from the farmer to the consumer. The first dinner mobilized NER’s huge network of 
churches, schools, civic organizations, businesses, labor unions, and local governments. In 
Chicago in 1923, an estimated 20,000 families took part. Governors, mayors, and other 
officials across the U.S. proclaimed support. Celebrities such as football star Red Grange 
endorsed the campaign, and child actor Jackie Coogan headlined condensed milk drives. 
The Grafton, North Dakota Walsh County Record wrote that “in a day when so many of our 
people have provincial attitudes, so provincial that many of them can glory in the slogan 
‘America First’ in its narrowest sense, we need this day in order to enlarge our vision and 
make us think of all nations and all men as members of one common family.” By 1927 there 
were over 16,000 local Golden Rule Sunday organizing committees, and 26 governors 
headed their state committees. On September 1, 1924 NER presented the idea to the 
Assembly of the League of Nations and, by 1928, it was observed in 53 countries.24   
 
23 “Are You Fed Up?” New Near East, 7 (March 1922), 6; Church Co-operation in Near 
East Relief: Containing Denominational Endorsements, Advisory Committees, Plans of Co-
operation, and Statements by Leader (New York, 1923).  Vickrey, International Golden Rule 
Sunday, 57, 130. 
24 “20,000 Families Here to Have Orphan Fare Tomorrow,” Chicago Tribune, Dec. 6, 
1923, p. 17; Mabel S.C. Smith, “Civic Cooperation in the International Golden Rule 
Campaign,” American City, 31 (Nov. 1924), 483, and “The Mayors and Golden Rule Day,” 
ibid., 33 (Nov. 1925), 513; “Grange Gets $30,000; Says It’s Secondary,” New York Times, Dec. 
7, 1925, p. 1; “Near East Bulletin: Jackie Coogan Funds,” June 21, 1924, folder 9, box 7, 
series 2, Talcott Williams Papers (Burke Library); “Jackie Coogan Here Today,” New York 
Times, Aug. 16, 1924, p. 6; “Calendar: International Golden Rule Sunday Report,” Dec. 7. 
1924, box 142, Albert Shaw Papers (New York Public Library); U.S. Congress, Senate, Near 
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Figure 4. Doctor Mabel Elliott works to save the life of an Armenian boy in Nov. 1922.25 
The new campaign no longer simply asked for donations of grain surplus, coins, or 
canned goods. NER fully partnered with certain processed food industries to commodify 
NER’s child welfare expertise in endorsing their food products as healthy. Doctor Mabel 
Elliott, the “modern Florence Nightingale,” directed NER hospitals and by the early 1920s 
was fairly well known in the U.S. With the rollout of Golden Rule Sunday publicity, Elliott 
figured prominently in articles syndicated to dozens of American newspapers. Placed 
under President Calvin Coolidge’s endorsement for the event, the article “American Foods 
Best Says Famous Doctor” quoted Elliott saying that certain “foods are now the backbone of 
all our menus for rebuilding children. . . . Our menus include . . . American flour . . . corn 
grits and liberal use of corn syrup, American condensed milk and American cocoa and 
macaroni, thus making a balanced ration to meet all scientific requirements as to relative 
 
East Relief. Report of the Near East Relief for the Year Ending December 31, 1928, 70 Cong., 2 
Sess., Feb. 25, 1929, S. Doc. 257, Serial 9000, p. 17. 
25 “Harvesting by Night,” New Near East, 7 (Nov. 1922), 7. 
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food values, calories, and vitamines.” Food industries used Elliott’s expertise in saving 
starving Armenian children to promote specific food products, not only for Golden Rule 
Sunday, but also as healthy food for American families all year long. Retail grocers put up 
window displays highlighting the campaign and these same products. The 1924 Golden 
Rule Sunday campaign sent out thousands of brochures entitled “The Golden Rule—and Big 
Business” to encourage endorsements and contributions across the country.26  
NER’s closest food industry relationship was with the Corn Products Refining 
Company (CPRC) and its Karo-brand corn syrup. The CPRC donated thousands of 
advertisements reminding Americans that its meals should include “milk, rice, bread, 
cocoa, beans, macaroni, and Karo, the great American food . . . . that helped save thousands 
of these little children from starvation.” Ads with titles such as “A Lesson for American 
Mothers” included a letter signed by NER’s chief medical officer, Doctor John C. Curran, 
stating that the “food experts of the NER have chosen Karo, along with condensed milk, 
beans, rice, macaroni and cocoa,” to give health and energy to the 115,000 recently starving 
orphans under its care. The campaign included recipes for the orphan’s favorite pudding of 
“corn grits with cocoa, sweetened with corn syrup . . . and American condensed milk.” This 
and similar recipes appeared in women’s magazines and newspapers through the 1920s. 
For Golden Rule Sunday in 1924, the CPRC donated 60,000 window displays, 3.5 million 
 
26 See letter regarding Mabel Elliott’s speaking tour, Irving J. Gumb, April 8, 1924, 
folder 9, box 7, series 2, Talcott Williams Papers (Burke Library); E. Guy Talbott, “Back to 
Ararat,” Forum, 72 (Aug. 1924), 284. A search of contemporary newspapers and magazines 
yielded several articles mentioning Elliott’s work before 1923. “American Foods Best Says 
Famous Doctor” Marysville Ohio Evening Tribune, Nov. 22, 1923, p. 2; although archival 
records do not indicate the circulation of this set of articles, in a cursory search I found it in 
at least four dozen American newspapers in late 1923; “Indorse December 2 Golden Rule 
Sunday,” Washington Evening Star Nov. 22, 1923, p. 19; “The Golden Rule—and Big 
Business,” box 138, Albert Shaw Papers (New York Public Library). 
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12-page recipe booklets, 1.5 million Golden Rule menus (using Karo corn syrup), and full-
page advertisements in the morning and evening papers of major American cities. In 1925, 
CPRC donated 4 million recipe booklets, added 5,000 billboards for one month, and paid for 
more than $50,000 in newspaper advertising. On December 2, 1926 alone, Golden Rule 
Sunday Karo ads appeared in 77 major U.S. newspapers.27 
 
27 For ads, see for example Chicago Tribune, Nov. 30, 1923, p. 6, Bridgeport Telegram, 
Dec. 4, 1924, p. 7, Reno Evening Gazette, Dec. 4, 1924, p. 7. For recipes, see for example 
Bellevue Gazette, Nov. 22, 1923 and Fairport Monroe County Mail, Nov. 22, 1923. Vickrey, 
International Golden Rule Handbook, 112; “Malvern Churches Unite for Observe Golden 
Rule Dinner,” Malvern Leader, Jan. 31, 1929; “Preliminary Report International Golden Rule 
Sunday Observance, 1924: Cooperating Committees and Organizations,” p. 7, folder 1, box 
18, series 2, “Near East Relief Bulletin: Golden Rule Plans,” June 21, 1924, folder 9, box 7, 
series 2, “Docket of Executive Committee Meeting,” May 25, 1925, folder 5, box 14, series 2, 
and “NER Karo Syrup Golden Rule Sunday Advertisements for Dec. 2, 1926, folder 9, box 
15, series 2, Talcott Williams Papers (Burke Library). Executive Committee minutes 
indicate the Corn Products refining Company (CPRC) donated 400,000 window displays in 
1924, see “Minutes: Executive Committee Near East Relief, Sep. 30, 1924,” p. 388, box 1, RG 
2, FA1305, Near East Foundation Records (Rockefeller Archive Center); “International 
Golden Rule Dinner Menu,” box 142, Albert Shaw Papers (New York Public Library). 
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Figure 5. Karo ad, Washington Evening Star, Nov. 30, 1923, p. 36.28 
The tax implications of supporting philanthropy changed radically for individuals 
during the period of NER’s work, but corporations could also benefit from making 
donations. After the national income tax took effect in 1913, the War Revenue Act of 1917 
allowed individual charitable deductions up to 15 percent of taxable income to offset the 60 
percent surtax levied on high incomes. In 1918, individual charitable bequests could be 
deducted from estate taxes. By the end of the war, the wealthy increased private giving and 
 
28 “A Lesson for American Mothers,” Washington Evening Star, Nov. 30, 1923, p. 36. 
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established more charitable trusts. Although tax law did not allow corporate deductions for 
charity until 1936, companies could write off advertising as business expenses and several 
states began allowing state tax deductions for corporate giving in the mid-1910s. Congress 
rejected a corporate deduction in 1919, 1928, and 1934, considering it controversial for 
corporations to use funds outside their duty to shareholders and beyond the powers of the 
state laws of incorporation. However, some corporations got around the deductibility issue 
by giving shares to charities as a “foregone dividend.” Beginning in 1925, NER owned 
shares of CPRC stock, although it is not clear from archival sources if they were donated by 
the CPRC in this manner. In any event, what is clear is that the nonprofit NER and for-profit 
CPRC worked closely together. From 1925 to 1928 CPRC’s Director Edward T. Bedford 
served on NER’s National Golden Rule Committee. Bedford was a former Standard Oil 
executive who launched into the corn syrup industry in 1901 with $2.5 million in capital 
from the Rockefellers and other Standard Oil executives. The Rockefeller family retained 
the majority of CPRC stock while its philanthropic arm was an early major financial 
supporter of NER.29 
Scholars and legal experts may debate whether corporate support of charities 
should be attributed to ideals of corporate social responsibility, the “halo effect,” or 
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“enlightened self-interest,” but this essay shows that the mutually-beneficial relationship of 
NER and the CPRC played an integral part in the political economy of processed food in the 
1920s. NER, as does any nonprofit organization, required help in spreading pleas to the 
American public to support its noble work in feeding tens of thousands of children. For the 
1924 Golden Rule Sunday campaign, NER budgeted only $100,000 for national publicity 
and urged its huge network to solicit free advertising from commercial and other 
organizations. NER also needed donations of money and calorie-rich foodstuffs with long 
shelf-lives that could be easily transported. The CPRC and other food manufacturers made 
huge donations of advertising to associate their brands with the work of NER in saving 
these starving children. NER accepted these donations and thereby associated their work in 
feeding children with the grains and processed foodstuffs that formed the staples of their 
orphanage meals. In particular, the interests of the CPRC and NER converged in promoting 
corn syrup as a healthy and calorie-rich food to nourish children.30 
 
Setting the Stage: Corn Syrup and the Pure Food Fight 
The decades-long controversies over consumer acceptance of corn sugars and the 
state’s role in its labeling shed light on why NER’s endorsement of corn syrup became so 
important for the CPRC in the 1920s. The debates also illuminate both the cooperative and 
contentious interactions within the political economy of food during the period. The 
philanthropy-business marriage proved significant to the interwar political economy of 
 
30 Knauer, “The Paradox of Corporate Giving,” 7; “Financial Organization and Cashing 
In,” International Golden Rule Sunday Report, Dec. 7, 1924, box 142, Albert Shaw Papers 
(New York Public Library).  
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processed food because the CPRC had been battling for decades with pure food experts to 
establish its products as healthful unadulterated foods for the American consumer.31 
Voluntary organizations, such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, began 
leading the push for unadulterated foods in the 1870s. Glucose, or corn syrup, was 
developed in 1881 by cooking cornstarch in an acid. It had half the sweetness of sugar 
made from cane or beets, which was chemically known as sucrose. Brewers and 
confectioners enthusiastically incorporated the cheaper sweetener. But glucose had an 
image problem, and many food producers and consumers were suspicious. Glucose was 
cooked with sulfuric acid and sounded like it came from a glue factory—consumers 
blanched and pure food crusaders had a field day. Farm journals criticized factory-made 
glucose as unhealthy compared to sorghum, maple, or cane syrups. In the 1890s, Harvey 
Wiley, Chief of the USDA Bureau of Chemistry, took up the pure food fight. He did not argue 
that glucose was inherently unhealthy but championed unadulterated foods and proper 
labeling of any additives to inform and protect consumers.32 
When first marketed as a table syrup in 1903, the Karo brand had to convince 
consumers that it was wholesome and tasty. The Corn Products Company, precursor to the 
CPRC, enlisted the state’s help to win over consumers. In 1904, Secretary of Agriculture 
James Wilson approved the company’s request to have the new USDA Standards Committee 
 
31 The term “corn sugars” was used in the period to describe syrup or granulated 
sweeteners derived from corn.  
32 Brian Peckham, Economics and Invention: A Technological History of the Corn 
Refining Industry of the United States (PhD Diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979), 
129–44, 176, 193–95. On the labeling fights, see Lessens, Master of Millions, 292–293; Oscar 
E. Anderson, The Health of a Nation: Harvey W. Wiley and the Fight for Pure Food (Chicago, 
1958), 71–74; Lorine Swainston Goodwin, The Pure Food, Drink, and Drug Crusades, 1879–
1914 (Jefferson, NC, 1999). 
 28 
allow manufacturers to substitute the term “corn syrup” for the unappealing term glucose. 
Karo ads declared corn syrup “the New Table Delicacy” made from “that portion of the corn 
kernel which contains the greatest strength-giving, energy-producing, and flesh-forming 
elements.” Neither the terms glucose nor corn syrup had to be listed on low-cost jams and 
jellies, which increasingly contained glucose in place of more costly cane sugar.33 
The glucose labeling decision did not last long. In 1906, the year that Bedford 
consolidated several firms as the Corn Products Refining Company (CPRC), Wiley and pure 
food crusaders succeeded in their long battle to convince Congress to pass the Pure Food 
and Drug Act. Within days of the new law, the USDA reversed its earlier decision and 
prohibited manufacturers from using the term corn syrup in place of glucose. The new law 
further stipulated that prepared foods must “conspicuously state” their ingredients starting 
in 1907. The CPRC got more bad news when Pennsylvania police arrested 500 small candy 
dealers for violating that state’s new pure food law which prohibited glucose made with 
sulphuric acid. The months-long litigation received nationwide attention highlighting 
CPRC’s five million dollar fine and leaving consumers with the impression that sulphuric 
acid remained in glucose after processing.34 
The CPRC chose to skirt the new labeling laws as it lobbied the USDA that corn syrup 
was a fitting term for glucose and a wholesome food. New Karo labels identified the 
 
33 Published as Circular Nos. 10 and 13, “Pure Food Standards,” New York Times, 
Nov. 22, 1903, p. 10; Clayton A. Coppin and Jack High, The Politics of Purity: Harvey 
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34 “A Fortnight Under the Pure Food Law,” New York Times, Jan. 13, 1907, p. SM5; 
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product as “Karo corn syrup with cane flavor,” neglecting to mention glucose. A similar 
controversy brewing over whiskies convinced Agriculture Secretary Wilson to appoint 
Wiley as head of a new three-man advisory, the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, to 
review industry appeals of pure food decisions. Wiley asserted that whiskey blends should 
not be labeled as whiskey because they derived their color from additives, not oak aging. 
President Theodore Roosevelt disagreed, and the U.S. Attorney General overruled Wiley’s 
interpretation on whiskey, setting an important precedent for food labeling under the Pure 
Food law. The Attorney General’s 1907 ruling stated that “the intention of the law will be 
best observed by giving to such articles names readily understood and conveying definite 
and familiar ideas to the general public, although such names may be inaccurate in the view 
of a chemist.” According to the state, what mattered for food labeling was how the public 
perceived a product rather than its chemical make-up. This decision foreshadowed the 
importance of molding consumer perceptions through marketing that would shape corn 
sugar fights in the 1920s—and the importance of endorsements as to its wholesomeness.35 
After losing a hearing before Wiley’s three-man board in September 1907 to allow 
the term corn syrup on its labels, the CPRC ramped up its appeals directly to Secretary 
Wilson and Roosevelt by mobilizing chemists, doctors, state food commissioners, grocers, 
and corn-belt state senators to attest that corn syrup was chemically similar to cane syrup 
and provided Americans with cheap healthful food. Bedford reminded Wilson about the 
 
35 See for example Karo ads in the New York Times, Dec. 6, 1907 and March 27, 1908; 
Lessens, Master of Millions, 309–310. On the whiskey controversy, see Coppin and High, The 
Politics of Purity, 100-17; “Rival Whiskey Makers at Food Law Hearing,” New York Times, 
Sep. 20, 1906, p. 5; Anderson, Health of a Nation, 201–03. On the Attorney General’s 1906 
whiskey decision, emphasis is mine, see USDA, Food Inspection Decision 83, Nov. 22, 1907. 
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Attorney General’s recent decision on whiskey labeling and that the glucose industry 
bought significant quantities of corn from American farmers.36  
In a new December 1907 hearing, the CPRC and Wiley argued the glucose labeling 
issue before Wilson himself. Responding to Bedford’s charge that the labeling decision hurt 
corn farmers, Wiley countered that the glucose industry was destroying the beekeeping, 
maple sugar, cane syrup, and sorghum industries. By 1906, corn syrups were outselling 
maple and cane syrups by a five-to-one margin. Interestingly, Wiley failed to disclose that 
he was also a paid consultant to cane and beet sugar refiners. Wilson asked for written 
opinions from the three members of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection. Wiley 
submitted a 172-page complaint against the CPRC. However, the two other board members 
had changed their minds since September, and Roosevelt again weighed in on a pure food 
issue. Upon examining a vial of Karo, the President concluded that it was a syrup made 
from corn. Wilson later recalled Roosevelt’s opinion as, “you must make the manufacturers 
call a spade a spade, but don’t make them call it a damn shovel.” In February 1908, the 
Secretaries of Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce signed Food Inspection Decision 87 
declaring that manufacturers could label glucose as corn syrup. Wiley’s disagreement with 
the decision would have to play out in the court of consumer opinion. A few months later, 
Wiley told the “Mother’s Congress” that table syrups, other than maple syrup, should “be 
carefully scrutinized in regard to their purity.” When he left the USDA in 1912 to join Good 
 
36 Corn Products Refining Company, Copies of Opinions of Chemists and Others on the 
Meaning of the Word ‘Syrup’ and the Use of the Term ‘Corn Syrup’ Under the ‘Food & Drug 
Act’ of 1906, Presented to the Honorable James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, Dec. 1907 
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Housekeeping magazine, Wiley refused CPRC advertisements and continued writing 
opinions against the labeling decision.37 
Wiley might have taken some consolation in the fact that corn syrup was still 
considered an adulterant when added to processed foods and had to be listed as an 
ingredient on food labels. Issued in 1907, USDA Food Inspection Decision (FID) 66 only 
allowed cane or beet sugar, known as sucrose, in processed foods without being listed on 
labels. FID 66 and later USDA decisions determined that a sweet taste was sufficient to tell 
the consumer that sugar was present, in essence ruling that only sucrose was considered 
sugar. The CPRC fought for the next two decades to convince consumers and the USDA that 
corn sugar was healthy and should be treated as regular sugar in processed foods—and 
therefore not added to the label. Between 1906 and 1916 Bedford spent over $5 million in 
advertising Karo, corn starch, and corn oil as wholesome corn products. Its 1916 annual 
report stated that “as a result of its activities, people everywhere are coming to realize that 
corn starch, corn syrup, and corn oil are among the most wholesome and nutritious, as well 
as the cheapest foods.” Karo grew in popularity yet still experienced consumer skepticism 
and Wiley’s continued attacks. Processed food manufacturers hesitated using corn syrup in 
their products due to lingering consumer distrust and sporadic USDA enforcement of 
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p.1; Shots from Dr. Wiley,” Good Housekeeping, Feb. 1913, p. 254; “Sparks from the Bench,” 
ibid., Nov. 1914, p. 631. 
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labeling requirements. Bedford complained to Secretary Wilson that food manufacturers 
were “afraid to use our products.”38  
The controversy lay dormant until 1923, the same year that NER launched its initial 
Golden Rule Sunday campaign. That year, the CPRC’s development of a crystalized and 
more commercially-viable corn sugar called “dextrose” launched the company on a 
renewed campaign to gain consumer confidence, remove USDA labeling restrictions, and 
alleviate farmers’ corn surplus. The USDA had struggled with solutions to the corn glut but, 
when Herbert Hoover took over as Commerce Secretary in 1921, he determined that his 
agency should be the primary engine to transform American industry, which included its 
food supply. He directed his Bureau of Standards to expand public-private collaboration in 
scientific research to support industry. The CPRC had been consulting with Bureau 
scientists since 1915 about making a more commercially-viable corn sugar. Corn syrup was 
useful as table syrup or in jams, mincemeat, and beer, but food manufacturers wanted a 
granulated corn sugar to substitute for expensive sucrose in processed foods needing a dry 
ingredient. In 1923 William Newkirk, a Commerce Department scientist first loaned to and 
then hired by the CPRC, developed a purer crystalized and commercially-viable corn sugar, 
known by chemists as dextrose and branded Cerelose by the CPRC. Wiley castigated the 
 
38 “The Use of Sugar in Canned Foods,” Food Inspection Decision 66, issued April 29, 
1907, see Charles Wesley Dunn, ed., Dunn’s Pure Food and Drug Manual (New York, 1912), 
76–77. On CPRC advertising expenditures, see “Corn Products Refining Co., New York: 
Report, Feb. 28, 1906 to Dec. 31, 1916,” Commercial Financial Chronicle, 103 (Dec. 23, 
1916), 2337. On continued consumer skepticism, see “The Dangers in Store Candies,” Good 
Housekeeping Jan. 1913, pp. 109–10; “Lessens, Master of Millions, 320–22. The CPRC also 
faced negative publicity from 1913 to 1919 due to anti-trust litigation, see “Corn Products 
Company Must Be Broken Up,” New York Times, Apr. 1, 1919, p. 20. 
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Commerce Department for purportedly designing the CPRC’s $500,000 research facility 
where Newkirk developed the product.39 
Cerelose cost pennies a pound and proved superior to sucrose for feeding baker’s 
yeast, texturizing candy, and preventing ice crystals in ice cream. It promised a cheaper 
sweetener and preservative in canned goods and for pickling. The CPRC doubled its initial 
production of 20 million pounds of the new product in the first year. But the Pure Food and 
Drug law and FID 66 continued to constrain the CPRC because the addition of any 
sweetener other than sucrose to processed foods had to be indicated on their labels. Some 
manufacturers still balked at listing corn sugar on its labels—much less the chemical term 
dextrose. The CPRC joined pro-farm newspapers, corn-belt politicians, and agribusiness 
interests to lobby the USDA to allow dextrose to join sucrose as a hidden additive. They 
argued that a robust corn sugars industry would absorb 480 million bushels of corn a year, 
larger than any previous surplus. It would revitalize corn prices for American farmers and 
create new export markets for corn—such as those being cultivated in the Near East. And it 
would provide healthy and cheap calorie-laden nutrition to the processed foods that were 
increasingly feeding America’s expanding population. Other farm advocates sought farm 
price supports rather than relying on the processed foods industry to stabilize agriculture. 
 
39 On Hoover’s efforts in Commerce, see Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce 
Secretariat, and the Vision of an Associative State,” 117-19, 121–25. On the development of 
crystallized corn sugar, see Rexmond C. Cochran, Measures for Progress: A History of the 
National Bureau of Standards (Washington, 1966), 265-267; Peckham, Economics and 
Invention, 338–41; Harvey Wiley, A History of a Crime: The Amazing Story Of The National 
Food And Drugs Law Intended To Protect The Health Of The People Perverted To Protect 
Adulteration Of Foods And Drugs (Washington DC, 1929), 300–03. 
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The USDA’s Henry Charles Taylor decried that Washington was more interested in 
providing cheap food to urban workers than in supporting farmers.40  
In 1924, Bedford asked the USDA’s Director of Regulatory Work Walter Campbell to 
allow the USDA’s interpretation of sugar in processed foods to include “dextrose sugar.” 
Campbell informed Bedford that the USDA could not simply decide what constituted a 
familiar food. In an opinion reminiscent of the U.S. Attorney General’s take on whiskey in 
1906, the USDA declared that “popular understanding and trade custom largely establish 
standards and this Department in its announcements undertakes to reflect . . . public 
judgment in those matters.” Only if consumers accepted that corn sugar was as wholesome 
in providing sweetness as cane and beet sugar would the USDA consider reviewing labeling 
standards. The Chicago Tribune predicted that the new product would have to “overcome 
the conservatism of the kitchen” by convincing homemakers of its wholesomeness.41 
 
Golden Rule Sunday and Corn Syrup as Health Food 
Thus, as Golden Rule Sunday swept the nation, the CPRC ramped up its campaign to 
convince consumers that corn sugar was not only as healthy as sucrose, but in fact more 
healthy. Doctors had used corn syrup since the nineteenth century to treat malnourished 
 
40 Peckham, Economics and Invention, 338–41; Lessens, Master of Millions, 329-330; 
Scrutator, “Surplus Corn of Future May Turn to Sugar,” Chicago Tribune, Aug. 17, 1924, p. 
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From Corn May Lower Prices,” Washington Post, April 20, 1924, p.1. See 1920s debates on 
thes McNary-Haugen Act. Taylor was dismissed as the head of the USDA’s Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics in 1925 and wrote of his experience in government in 1926 in A 
Farm Economist in Washington, 1919-1925, which was not published until 1992 by the 
University of Wisconsin Press. 
41 Lessens, Master of Millions, 332; Scrutator, “Sugar Made of Corn Entering Market 
Slowly,” Chicago Tribune, Aug. 16, 1924, p. 16. 
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children or invalids because it was easily digested and calorie-rich. Golden Rule Sunday 
Karo ads told consumers that “Near East children show that as an invigorating health-
building food. . . . Karo contains the vitalizing food element, Dextrose, which your doctor 
can tell you has a tremendous health value.” The CPRC highlighted NER endorsements from 
its orphanages in conjunction with new medical studies about the health benefits of 
dextrose and glucose for babies and children. These studies recommended Karo as an 
additive to milk to make a nutritious and fattening infant formula. The CPRC placed ads for 
Karo in The American Journal of the Medical Sciences in 1924 touting the nourishing 
qualities of corn syrup as the best ingredient for homemade infant formula.42  
 Also prominent in the Golden Rule Sunday campaign, Borden’s condensed milk was 
using corn sugars for sweetening by the mid-twenties. Employing NER endorsements, 
Borden’s Nutrition Department in 1924 launched a national health crusade against 
malnourishment in American children. Borden quoted Curran, “Our experience with 
115,000 orphan children of the Near East shows that there is no more valuable food than 
condensed milk for restoring half-starved children to health and strength.” The American 
Food Journal provided Golden Rule Sunday recipes using condensed milk from Oscar, chef 
at the Waldorf-Astoria. After the first Golden Rule dinner, NER launched an effort to collect 
one million cans of condensed milk on a transcontinental train. Curran travelled on the 
 
42 Dextrose is a monosaccharide and more easily metabolized than the disaccharide 
sucrose which must be broke down in the stomach to be absorbed, see Peckham, Economics 
and Invention, 98, 115, 341. See an example Karo ad touting Dextrose, Charleston Gazette 
Dec. 2, 1926, p. 7. On medical benefits, see “Pediatrics,” American Journal of the Medical 
Sciences, 167 (Feb. 1924), 255, quoting a study “Acidified Whole Milk as a Routine Infant 
Food,” Journal of American Medical Association, 81 (1923), 2007. On ads, see for example “A 
Good Milk Modifier in Infant Feeding,” American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 167 (April 
1924), 9; “A Valuable Addition to the Diet of Child and Adult,” American Journal of the 
Medical Sciences, 168 (Nov. 1924), 8. 
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milk train endorsing the healthful effects of sweetened condensed milk. NER recruited the 
nine-year old child star Jackie Coogan to sail on the “Million Dollar Milk Ship” filled with 
condensed milk, corn syrup, and flour and deliver it personally to Near East orphanages in 
support of the “Golden Rule Crusade.” Boy Scouts collected and packaged up donations 
along the route. In 1925, Borden paid for a ”four color card in all street cars and subways in 
the United States” endorsing Golden Rule Sunday.43 
The CPRC and NER, along with other food producers, looked for creative new joint 
marketing techniques to encourage Americans to buy more Karo and other processed foods 
for both NER donations and for their own consumption. For the 1925 Golden Rule Sunday 
campaign, Curran, serving as both chief health expert and NER’s key liaison to the 
processed foods industry, attended the National Retail Grocer’s convention to discuss 
NER’s project for “Golden Rule Sunday and the Retail Grocer.” In addition to buying certain 
processed foods for their Golden Rule Dinners and donating the cost difference to NER, the 
new program encouraged consumers to buy these foods throughout the year to send to 
 
43 “Running a Near East Orphanage,” Journal of Home Economics, 13 (Aug. 1921), 
382; Helen Rich Baldwin, “Commercial Nutrition Work Among Children: Borden Company 
Conducts Experiments and Class Work in Cooperation with Health Organizations and 
Schools,” American Food Journal, 18 (Aug. 1923), 382-383; “The Scourge of Childhood 
Threatens Our Schools: Join the New Health Crusade Against Malnutrition,” American Food 
Journal, 19 (Jan. 1924), 24-25. On Curran’s quote, see Helen Rich Baldwin, Nutrition and 
Health: With Twenty Suggested Lessons for Nutrition Classes (1924; New York, 1929), 74. 
For an example of recipes, see “Some Golden Rule Dinners,” American Food Journal, 19 
(Nov. 1924), 534-525. On the milk drive, see “Milk for Near East Relief,” New York Times, 
Feb. 10, 1924, p. E3; “The Golden Rule Crusade,” New Near East (Sep. 1924), 12, box 168, 
series 10, RG 1, FA 406, Near East Foundation (Rockefeller Archive Center); “Boy Scouts,” 
New York Times, March 23, 1924, X13; “Jackie Coogan Here Today,” ibid., Aug. 16, 1924, p. 6; 
“Paris Gives Jackie a Royal Welcome,” ibid., Sep. 21, 1924, p. E2; Boy Scouts of America. 
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NER because of their nutritious properties for growing children. Backed by the CPRC, Retail 
Grocers Association, Borden Milk, and Pillsbury Flour, the campaign allowed people to fill 
out cards with their local grocers indicating which products they wished to purchase for 
NER orphans. Retail grocers took payment and sent the cards to the wholesale suppliers to 
ship foods directly to NER. Both the retailer and wholesaler made their profits, passing on 
profits to manufacturers and farmers, and the NER received goods paid for by American 
consumers. Grocers joined the CPRC and NER to tell American mothers they were doing the 
right thing by buying these products. Ultimately, NER developed a system of philanthropy 
that spurred much-needed giving but also supported profits for entire supply chains of 
several American food industries.44  
With the benefit of several years of positive NER-related publicity for the 
healthfulness of corn syrup, Bedford, farm lobbyists, and corn-belt politicians asked 
Congress to amend the 1906 Pure Food and Drug law itself to get around the USDA’s 
regulatory interpretation. In December 1925, Senator Albert Cummins and Congressman 
Cyrenus Cole, both of Iowa, introduced a bill to expand the definition of sugar to include 
corn sugars. The Chicago Tribune reported that “the bill had the backing of more than a 
million farmers and businessmen of the corn belt.” The newspaper promoted a six-plank 
farm program which included removing “the stigma from corn sugar.” Grass-roots lobbyists 
gave away free samples of dextrose to housewives. Grocers set up displays with sacks of 
corn sugar and—however unpalatable—corn syrup poured over corn flakes. The powerful 
American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) lobbied hard in support of the bill, which 
 
44 Dubuque Telegraph Herald, June 24, 1925, p. 1.; “Golden Rule Sunday,” American 
Food Journal, 20 (Oct. 1925), 481. 
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quickly passed the Senate and gained Coolidge’s support. But growing criticism derailed a 
quick passage and led the House to call hearings on the bill in March 1926 before the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.45 
At the hearings, Commerce’s Bureau of Standards pitted itself against the USDA’s 
Regulatory Service which brought in pure food crusader Wiley to lead the attack against 
the measure. Frederick Bates, head of the Bureau of Standards, testified that “a 
carbohydrate of great food value, great stability, great purity, and great cheapness” should 
be made available to consumers while helping the corn industry and American farmers. 
The Bureau provided a report with numerous doctors and scientists attesting to the 
healthfulness of dextrose and its chemical similarity to honey and sucrose. Without 
specifically mentioning NER’s work with orphans, the report cited American doctors 
attesting to corn sugar being the “best product on the market” for “feeding malnutrition 
cases in children and small babies.” But while the carefully-worded endorsements agreed 
that dextrose was healthy “in moderation,” when used “in an ordinary diet,” and that it 
posed the risk of diabetes “no more than the same amount of sucrose,” the experts did not 
address the effects of consuming large quantities of dextrose if it were added to many 
processed foods.46  
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27; “A Sweet Thing for the Corn Belt,” ibid., Dec. 31, 1925, p. 6; Arthur Evans, “See Corn 
Sugar as One Relief for Farm Woes,” ibid., Jan. 1, 1926, p. 35; “A Farm Program,” ibid., Jan. 8, 
1926, p. 8; “1,000 Samples of Corn Sugar Are Given Away,” ibid., Jan. 26, 1926, p. 26; 
“President Agrees to Farm Bloc Bill,” New York Times, Jan. 9, 1926, p. 4. 
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Wiley countered that he did not object to the basic healthfulness of glucose or 
dextrose, but that their extensive use in processed foods could be dangerous to the 
American diet. “I have no quarrel for use of dextrose in hospitals,” Wiley said, but its easy 
absorption could harm the natural digestive process and, because dextrose had half the 
sweetness of sucrose, twice as much of it was required in place of sucrose in processed 
foods. Wiley argued that too much dextrose in the body cannot be burned: “It is converted 
into an inert substance called glycogen and is stored up in this condition in the liver and in 
the tissues. . . . If we flood our stomachs with dextrose, then we will need half a dozen 
artificial pancreases.” He fundamentally believed that consumers should know of any 
additives to their foods. But his primary concern was the danger to health if cheap corn 
sugars were increasingly added to processed foods—particularly without telling 
consumers that they were present. By “permitting dextrose to be used in food products 
without notice, as much as two billion pounds would enter into the stomachs of the 
American people annually.”47 
Wiley did not sway congressional leaders who sided with King Corn’s agricultural 
and industrial lobbyists. The bill passed in the House by a small majority, but when 
returned to the Senate for a final vote, Senator Matthew Neely of West Virginia successfully 
filibustered it by reading from Good Housekeeping magazine. Neely said his aims were to 
protect American consumers from adulterated foods and to defend the Pure Food law. 
Others agreed. The Washington Post noted, “The food law has been of inestimable value to 
food consumers of this country. It would be a misfortune to begin its mutilation.” The Wall 
 
47 Wiley, A History of a Crime, 315, 318. 
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Street Journal urged the corn sugars lobby to educate and seek the approval of “the 
housewife” to achieve labeling changes.48 
In response, the CPRC launched new campaigns to sweeten the American consumer 
on corn sugars and continued to tie Karo and dextrose to children’s nutrition in Golden 
Rule Sunday marketing. Ads targeted mothers with cartoons of healthy children raised on 
Karo, the “energy food” or “health food,” that built strong bodies. In home economics 
journals, CPRC ads claimed: “Leading Doctors, dieticians and pediatrists highly recommend 
Karo  for children—particularly in cases of malnutrition.” In op-eds supporting the corn 
industry, commenters referred to NER medical endorsements of corn syrup as healthy, 
noting that “orphanage directors testify as to the wonderful food values of corn syrup.” To 
better infiltrate American kitchens, the CPRC commissioned Ida Bailey Allen, among the 
first celebrity cooking experts, to write a corn products cookbook called The Modern 
Method of Preparing Delightful Foods. She advocated Karo for both its wholesomeness and 
for “that deliciousness achieved by the best French chefs.” Babies particularly benefitted 
from milk spiked with corn syrup which is “easily assimilated” to “furnish immediate 
energy.”49  
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Figure 6. Karo ad in the Fairfield Ledger, Nov. 17, 1927.50 
 
Interestingly, corn farmers went silent about corn sugar labeling in 1927 and 1928. 
Manufacturers increasingly bought up corn sugars for cattle feed, rayon, synthetic rubber, 
explosives, tanning, and food additives such as citric acid and riboflavin. Corn sugar 
production jumped by nearly 400,000 pounds from 1925 to 1927, increasing nine-fold 
from 1920 to 1929. Illegal but profitable uses for corn likely also help explain farmers’ 
sudden lack of interest in labeling fights. Prohibition Commissioner James Doran estimated 
that ninety-five percent of illegal whiskey was made with corn sugar from the “bone-dry” 
Midwest. After the 1929 Jones Act strengthened federal penalties for bootlegging, one corn 
sugar producer reported a twenty-five percent drop in orders.51 
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By 1930, events converged to renew the push for more relaxed labeling. The 
country faced more failing farms and the farm lobby was once again interested in legal corn 
sugars. In March, the CPRC formally petitioned Agriculture Secretary Henry Hyde for a new 
policy recognizing corn sugar “as a pure, wholesome and nutritious food placed upon an 
equality with other sugars.” Bedford reminded Hyde that the CPRC bought more than thirty 
percent of the cash corn crop. The AFBF, supported by a letter campaign from its corn-belt 
housewives, and midwestern newspapers rallied around the measure. In a three-hour 
hearing before Hyde in July 1930, a CPRC attorney said that under the current regulation 
many manufacturers were still unwilling to use corn sugars in their processed foods. He 
argued that approval would mean farmers could sell 40 million more bushels of corn a 
year. Senator William Hull of Illinois argued that if corn sugar was “beneficial to sick babies 
it cannot be considered anything but beneficial to mankind in general.” Years of 
humanitarian and medical-expert messaging now permeated the debate. In opposition, 
Mrs. Harvey Wiley (her husband had died the previous month) joined a group of non-corn 
belt state agricultural departments and beekeepers headed by Congressman Franklin 
Menges of Pennsylvania. Anna Wiley declared that “to the housewife sugar is sucrose” and 
that selling processed foods without alerting consumers to other ingredients was 
deceptive.52 
With no decision by Hyde forthcoming, the AFBF and a large group of corn-belt 
politicians urged President Hoover to force a decision. As noted, Hoover’s Commerce 
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Department had been behind development of crystalized dextrose in the first place. The 
day after Christmas 1930, Secretary Hyde gifted the CPRC and corn farmers a new 
regulation that declared “the use of pure refined corn sugar as an ingredient in the packing, 
preparation, or processing of any article of food in which sugar is a recognized element 
need not be declared upon the label of any such product.” Hyde, likely pushed by Hoover, 
now believed that economic support for farmers trumped consumer perceptions as long as 
the product was not considered unhealthy. He declared that corn sugar was a “wholesome 
and healthful food.” The CPRC announced it would double production of corn sugars and 
build another plant. Anna Wiley lamented that the revision “will do much to weaken the 
confidence of consumers in the federal enforcement of the pure food which heretofore had 
been a bulwark of safety for the food of the nation.” Corn sugars would not have to be 
labeled on processed foods again until 1966.53 
 
Philanthropy and the Political Economy of Food  
It is difficult to ascertain how much NER’s endorsement of corn syrup contributed to 
the product’s ultimate acceptance by consumers and the ensuing changes in food additive 
regulations. Likely the concern with helping farmers by absorbing corn surplus weighed 
heavily with the state. But for the first three decades of the twentieth century, the corn 
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products industry expended tremendous resources in convincing American consumers and 
the state that its products were healthy. The USDA consistently told the CPRC that it had to 
change consumer perceptions of healthfulness in order to change labeling regulations. The 
CPRC needed the endorsement of experts considered eminently unbiased and credible. 
NER fit this bill perfectly with its well-earned image of humanitarianism and child health 
expertise. The before and after pictures of horribly starved children testified to NER’s 
competence and corn syrup’s value. The CPRC and its Karo brand absorbed this image as its 
own. Well into the 1950s, Karo still marketed corn syrup as a health food for children. Good 
mothers fed their children plenty of carbohydrates, and “eminent child specialists” 
recommended Karo for “easy absorption…without strain on the delicate digestive tissues of 
the child’s body.” The most famous babies of the era, the Dionne Quintuplets born in 1934, 
were raised on corn syrup formula, and the CPRC paid $15,000 a year for the babies’ 
endorsements.54 
By 1930, NER had ended its Golden Rule Sunday campaign and, with orphans aging 
out of its care, NER trustees voted to incorporate a new Near East Foundation in New York 
State and to shift focus to developmental aid.  Over its 15 years, NER raised over 
$116,000,000—over two billion dollars today—and supported 132,000 orphans into 
adulthood. The organization estimated that it had saved the lives of over a million 
Armenians and others. Its heroic relief workers fanned out across the Near East bringing 
the bounty of America to millions in need.55  
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And back in the U.S., NER helped farmers offload grain surpluses and pioneered 
partnerships with American industry to acculturate consumers to buy retail products in 
order to help others. Through its Golden Rule Sunday campaign, NER integrated mass 
philanthropy into the interwar political economy by partnering with the state and business, 
endorsing consumer confidence in certain processed foods, and commodifying the giving 
impulse. Its experience shows that the tripartite amalgam of state, business, and nonprofit 
sectors operated in collaborative and also contested ways. In NER’s case, it did not grow to 
occupy the sinister position that some congressmen imagined when it was federally 
incorporated, but its humanitarian role did give it unique power to influence how 
consumers and the state interacted with the American food industry. NER’s history 
illuminates a significant early chapter in understanding how philanthropy has developed 
an integral role in the American political economy.  
 
